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We often fall victim of an illusory sense of control and agency over our thoughts and 
actions.  Magicians are masters at exploiting these illusions and forcing techniques provide a 
powerful way to study apparent action causation – the illusion that our action caused the 
outcome we get. In this paper, we used the Criss-Cross force to study whether people can tell 
the difference between an action which had an impact on the outcome they get and one which 
has no impact.  In the Criss-Cross force, participants are asked to cut to a card, and whilst they 
are genuinely free to cut the cards at any position, the cut does not impact the card they are 
given (i.e. they always get the top card).  We investigate the psychological processes that 
underpin the success of this force. Experiment 1 (N=60) showed that participants cannot tell the 
difference between a forced and a controlled outcome. Experiment 2 (N=90) showed that 
contrary to common magicians’ knowledge, misdirection does not play a role in the success of 
the force. Finally, experiment 3 (N=60) suggests that rather than misdirection, an attribute 
substitution error explains why people fail to understand that their action do not have an impact 
on the outcome they get. Debriefings also shows the importance of participants’ expectations 
in the perception of the trick, as well as the role of prediction of the outcome in participants’ 







Although we generally like to feel in control over our environment and the outcome of 
our actions, we often fall victim to an illusory sense of control and agency over our thoughts 
and actions (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009; Langer, 
1975; Sweeney, Drevno, & Benassi, 1979). Back in 1853, Faraday conducted an ingenious 
experiment to study the table turning phenomenon, commonly reported in Victorian Spiritualist 
séances.  His empirical investigation revealed an intriguing dissociation between our sense of 
control and our actions. The ghostly movements resulted from people moving the table, without 
experiencing any will over their motor movements. On the other hand, we often overestimate 
our ability to control random events (Langer, 1975), and report illusory causality between 
unrelated events (Matute et al., 2015).  These findings demonstrate that we are pretty poor at 
evaluating the true outcome of an action, or event. Sense of agency refers to our feeling of 
controlling external events through our own actions (Chambon, Sidarus, & Haggard, 2014), and 
it is relatively easy to provoke an illusory sense of control over the outcome of an action (Barlas 
& Laurier, 2016; Barlas & Obhi, 2013; Lynn, Berger, Riddle, & Morsella, 2010; Tobias-Webb 
et al., 2017).  Wegner’s apparent mental causation (1999) points out the illusion that our 
thoughts are the cause of an action. In the same way, we sometimes seem to experience what 
we call here an apparent action causation, providing the illusion that our actions caused an 
outcome. This apparent causation is what gives us the illusion that we are controlling the result 
of an event. 
Psychologists are competent at studying illusions, but magicians are true masters at 
exploiting them, and the illusion of apparent action causation is central to magic. In a magic 
trick, the audience experiences wonder because they erroneously attribute a magical cause, 
rather than the true cause (the secret method), to what they have just seen (Kuhn, 2019). More 
specifically, the principle of forcing, is entirely based on this apparent action causation. Forces 
refer to tricks where magicians subtly and covertly influence a spectator’s choice. We have 
recently started to categorize this wide range of forcing techniques (Pailhès & Kuhn, 2019) and 
come to the conclusion that there are two main types of forcing categories: techniques that 
directly influence the spectator’s choice – as the typical definition suggests, and techniques 
which provide the spectators a genuinely free choice, but in which the outcome of the decision 
is manipulated (Annemann, 1940; Banachek, 2002; Jones, 1994).  
Let us now take a closer look at these two types of forces. Choice forces refer to 
techniques in which the magician covertly influences a person’s choice, and several of these 
techniques have been empirically investigated (Kuhn, Pailhès, & Lan, 2020). Shalom and 
colleagues studied the “Classic Force”, which involves asking a spectator to choose a card by 
physically picking it.  The magician is handling the cards so that the target card reaches the 
person’s fingers at the moment he/she picks one. Empirical studies have shown that this force 
was successful 45% of the time, and participants reported the same amount of freedom for 
forced choices and unforced choices. Another forcing technique, known as the Visual Force 
(Olson, Amlani, Raz, & Rensink, 2015) consists of riffling through a deck of cards in front of 
a spectator’s eyes while asking them to mentally pick one they see in the riffle. During the riffle, 
the target card is shown slightly longer than the others, which makes it more salient, restricting 
the spectator’s choice and influencing him/her to pick it. Olson and colleagues found that 98% 
of participants chose the forced card, and, again, they reported feeling that they had a free 
choice, even though they were manipulated.   
We would like to investigate a second category of forces– outcome forces. Outcome 
forces rely on the apparent action causation illusion, and they are the most commonly used  
conjuring force.  Outcome forces typically consist of letting the spectator make a genuinely free 
choice, but unknown to the spectator, this choice has no impact on the outcome of the selection.  
For example, the magician might ask the spectator to choose a card, and whilst the spectator 
genuinely has some control over the selection process, the outcome of this choice always results 
in him/her ending up with the same card.  In other words, the magician provides the illusion 
that the selection causes that particular outcome.   
Outcome forces are closely related to choice blindness (Hall & Johansson, 2008; Hall, 
Johansson, Sikström, Tärning, & Lind, 2006), a phenomenon in which people fail to notice the 
mismatch between their choice and its outcome, and often end up justifying their choice based 
on information they never had in the first place. For example, Johansson and Hall (2008) asked 
people to choose between two female faces, after which the experimenter surreptitiously 
switched the chosen picture for the rejected one. Most participants failed to notice the switch, 
and when asked to explain their choice, and came up with elaborate justifications.  Since these 
justifications were based on the previously rejected image, these explanations cannot reflect the 
true source of their decision. In other words they were blind of their choice (Hall et al., 2013; 
Rieznik et al., 2017).   
Magicians have developed a wide range of outcome forces, and these techniques provide 
powerful and reliable ways to study the illusory sense of agency we have over the outcome of 
the decisions and actions we make - apparent action causation. The sense of control over the 
outcome of our actions has been repeatedly shown to be important in health and well-being 
(Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Lang & Heckhausen, 2001; Seligman, 1975). Understanding the 
underlying psychological processes involved in the success of these forces could shed light onto 
more general cognitive processes involved in people’s sense of control over their environment, 
therefore providing new ways to enhance it. 
The present paper examines one of these outcome forces, known as the Criss-Cross Force, 
and aims to (1) investigate whether people can be tricked into experiencing an illusory sense of 
agency over an outcome they do not control (Experiment 1), and (2) understand the underlying 
psychological mechanisms that underpin this force (Experiments 2 and 3). 
  
The Criss Cross Force 
 The Criss-Cross Force is a simple forcing technique, which ensures that the spectator 
will end up with a predetermined card (see suplementary material for a video of the force).  The 
spectator is asked to freely cut a deck of cards wherever they want (See Figure 1b). The 
magician then takes the bottom pile and places it on the top of the top one in a crossed figure 
(Figure 1c and d). After this, some misdirection takes place, and the magician diverts the 
spectator’s attention away from the deck, thus preventing them from encoding the relevant 
information (during d and before e). A common way of doing this is to ask the spectator a 
question whilst establishing eye contact.  Indeed Kuhn et al.,(2016) have shown that this form 
of social misdirection prevents people from noticing highly salient changes in their environment 
Figure 1. Criss Cross Force main steps: From the beginning the forced card is on the top of the deck 
(numbered 1 here to facilitate the comprehension to the reader). In (b) the spectator cuts the deck of cards, in 
(c/d) the magician puts the bottom pile on the top of the top one in a cross shape, (e) the magicians removes 
the top pile and tells the spectator to take “his/her card” by pointing at the forced card, and in (f) the spectators 
ends up with the forced card which he/she believes to be the other card, selected by the cut. 
(i.e. the back of playing cards changing from blue to red).  We predict that this form of social 
misdirection will make it harder for people to mentally retrace the events and thus realize that 
they are taking the top card. After this, the magician goes back to the deck of cards and asks the 
spectator to look at the card he/she “freely selected thanks to his/her cut”. To do this, the 
conjurer takes the top pile of the cross away, points at the first card of the bottom pile while 
asking them to take the card “they selected”. But if read carefully, what just happened is that 
the magician pointed at the card which was the top card of the deck from the very beginning 
(card labelled number 1 on Figure 1), and not a card resulting in the spectator’s choice and 
action. The spectator had absolutely no control over the outcome of the trick, here the card 
chosen by the magician in advance, which he or she puts at the top of the deck before the trick 
began. 
 To summarize, the Criss-Cross force is commonly used by magicians, and while there 
is much anecdotal evidence supporting the idea that it works, it has never been empirically 
tested.  
 Experiment 1 aimed to examine how effective the Criss-Cross was by comparing 
participants’ sense of control for a forced outcome to a controlled one. Experiments 2 and 3 
aimed to investigate the underpinning mechanisms of the success of this trick, looking into 
misdirection (Experiment 2) and attribute substitution (Experiment 3).  
 
Experiment 1  
The aim of the first experiment was to objectively evaluate whether the Criss-Cross Force 
could be used to effectively force a card without people realizing that their choice was forced.  
In other words, can people tell the difference between an action which had an impact on the 
outcome they get (controlled outcome) and an action which has no impact (forced outcome)?  
To do so, we asked participants to cut to a card and either select the card they genuinely cut to, 
or one that was forced through the Criss-Cross procedure. Participants’ sense of agency over 
the outcome of the event was measured using  common scales - asking about the feeling of 
control over the outcome card (Barlas, Hockley, & Obhi, 2018; Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Linser 
& Goschke, 2007; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007; Sato & Yasuda, 2005).  
Since this forcing technique is commonly used among magicians, we predicted that 





60 participants (35 women, 25 men) between 18 and 50 years old (M=24.3, SD=5.85) 
recruited on Goldsmiths University campus took part in the experiment. Goldsmiths 
Psychology Department provided ethical approval for the three experiments. 
 
Procedure 
Thanks to a simple change in the event sequence of the trick, we were able to get 
someone to have the forced card, or their actual chosen card (i.e. the card they cut to in the 
deck). For this, the magician/experimenter simply has to invert the piles when doing the cross 
shape: if, instead of taking the left pile (Figure 1 c) she takes the right pile to put it on the top 
of the other, and then, as for the force, points at the card which is at the centre of the cross 
(Figure 1 e), this time this card is indeed the participant’s chosen card. 
Based on the prior descriptions, we had two experimental conditions: a final card 
controlled by the participant thanks to his/her action of cutting the deck (controlled outcome) 
and one which was controlled and forced by the experimenter thanks to the manipulation of the 
right pile when doing the cross (forced choice). Each participant was randomly assigned to one 
of the two conditions. 
The experimenter was sitting at a table in the University cafeteria, with the deck of cards 
already on the table. The experiment was presented as a study about magic tricks and decision 
making. We decided not to shuffle the deck before the trick so that this would not impact their 
sense of control over what happened. The experimenter asked the participant to cut the deck 
wherever they wanted and put their pile next to the bottom one. The experimenter then, 
depending on the condition, took one of the piles to put it on the top of the other in a cross 
shape. After the cross shape was done, she deployed her misdirection by asking “I’m sorry, 
what is your name again?”; It is important to note that this misdirection did not distract 
participants from perceiving the cut sequence, as it occurred after, rather than during the cut 
procedure. The misdirection was simply intended to prevent participants from correctly 
remembering, and reconstructing the event sequence.   
After the participant responded, the experimenter took away the top pile and pointed at 
the target card while instructing the participant to “take their card”. The participants were asked 
not to look at the card before answering the questionnaire, to prevent any bias linked to the card 
selection. They then completed a paper questionnaire with two questions about (1) how free 
they felt about cutting the deck wherever they wanted, and (2) how much control they felt they 
had over the card they selected. The questions were on a scale from 0 (not free at all, no control 
at all) to 100 (extremely free and in control). We asked how free participants felt about cutting 
the deck because participants are directly involved in most of the event sequence - they cut to 
a random card.  In other words, it is the action of cutting the deck and being involved 
“determining” the chose card that provides the illusory sense of control over the outcome that 
participants report 
We also recorded whether participants in the forced condition, understood that their card was 
forced (during the trick or the debriefing) before they were fully debriefed. If the participant 
was in the forced choice condition, the experimenter revealed she knew the card to the 
participant had before they looked at it and asked them if they had an idea about how she knew 
about it. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Out of the 30 participants in the forced choice condition, only 2 understood that their card 
was forced. This confirms that the Criss-Cross Force is very effective at fooling people into 
thinking their action/choice caused the outcome they get. Gathering both conditions, the mean 
feeling of freedom for cutting the deck wherever they wanted was 78.3 and the mean feeling of 
control over the outcome was 46.8 (See Figure 2). 
 
As the data were not normally distributed, we used a Bayesian Mann-Whitney test. The 
Bayesian analysis allowed us to look for evidence for our null hypothesis, showing that 
participants could not differentiate between a forced and a controlled outcome (Figure 2). 
 
 Figure 2: Feeling of freedom over the action of cutting the deck and sense of agency over the outcome 
card across the two experimental conditions. Error bars are represented for 95% confidence intervals.  
 
We analysed the data with JASP (JASP Team, 2018). An annoted .jasp file, including 
distribution plots, data, and input options is available at https://osf.io/hbmn8. 
First, we discuss the results for hypothesis testing regarding participants’ sense of agency. 
The null hypothesis states that there is no difference in the feeling of control between the groups 
and therefore H0: δ = 0, and δ was assigned a Cauchy prior distribution with r = .707. Figure 
3a shows that the Bayes factor indicates evidence for H0; specifically, BF01 = 3.79, which 
means that the data are approximately 3.8 times more likely to occur under H0 than under H1. 
This result indicates moderate evidence in favour of H0.  
Regarding the results for parameter estimation, of interest is the posterior distribution of 
the standardized effect size δ (i.e., the population version of Cohen’s d, the standardized 
difference in mean sense of control). Figure 3a shows that the resulting posterior distribution 
peaks at δ = 0.003 (the posterior median) with a central 95% credible interval for δ that ranges 
from -0.48 to 0.47, which provide more evidence for our null hypothesis. Both descriptive 
(Figure 2) and Bayesian analyses (Figure 3a) provide evidence that participants do not feel 
different sense of control over the outcome they get (i.e., the card) from the Criss-Cross, 
confirming that the trick makes it difficult to understand their choice has no impact on the result 
they have. 
 
For the feeling of freedom, we also had a null hypothesis stating that participants would 
feel the same amount of freedom as they were free to cut the deck where they wanted in both 
conditions. Figure 3b shows that the Bayes factor indicates some anecdotal evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis, with a Bayes factor of B10= 1.95. Figure 3 shows that mean feeling of 
freedom tended to be weaker in the forced outcome condition than in the controlled outcome 
one. This is interesting, as both groups were indeed free to cut the deck wherever they wanted 
and could suggest a type of unconscious knowledge from forced participants that they have 
been somewhat manipulated. We also cannot rule out the possibility that the experimenter non-
intentionally behave differently when doing the different sequence events. The resulting 
posterior distribution peaks at δ=0.533 with a central 95% credible interval for δ ranging from 
-0.04 to 1.08. If the effect is assumed to exist, there remains substantial uncertainty about its 
size, with values close to 0 having the same posterior density as values close to 1. 
 
Figure 3: Bayesian Mann-Whitney test showing prior and posterior distributions for the sense 
of agency (a) and feeling of freedom (b). 
 
To conclude, these first results confirm that the Criss-Cross is a very powerful force, 
although really simple. Very few participants (2, 6%) understood their action did not have any 




The second experiment aimed to investigate the psychological processes underpinning 
the Criss-Cross Force. 
 The magic literature suggests that the Criss Cross Force relies on misdirection, in that it 
prevents the spectator from encoding the relevant information and thus confusing the spectator 
about the card selection. For example Fajuri suggests to “pause for a moment. [to] do something 
to take the spectator’s mind off the cards.” and that “once they’ve forgotten about the pack for 
a moment or two, [to] come back to it and ask the spectator to remove the card from the spot 
they cut to” (Fajuri, 2003, p.6). Moreover, we asked 91 magicians to rate on scales from 0 (not 
important at all) to 100 (very important) the importance of 8 different factors for the trick to 
success (among the magician’s expertise, the time delay between the crucial steps of the trick, 
the expectations of the spectator, the unusal dealing of the cards, the misdirection during the 
time delay, the age of the spectator, the environment in which the trick is performed and 
“other”). The results showed that magicians think the most important factor on which the Criss 
Cross Force relies is the time delay between the cross shape done by the magician and the 
moment he asks the spectator to take the forced card (M= 82.4, SD=20.0). The second most 
chosen factor, closely following the delay was the misdirection introduced during this time 
delay (79.5, SD=20.0). Then came the magician’s expertise about the trick (59.0, SD=33.4). 
Therefore, two different types of misdirection seem to be invovled for the Criss Cross 
to work - memory and attentional misidrections (Kuhn, Caffaratti, Teszka, & Rensink, 2014). 
Following Kuhn et al. misdirection taxonomy, attentional misdirection involves diverting 
attention away from the deck of cards through the help of social cues (e.g. asking his or her 
name, or any other random question). This interaction also acts as time misdirection in that it 
creates a time delay between the cut and the card selection process, which should enhance the 
chances of misremembering the exact action sequence.   
We therefore investigated two variables, namely the attentional misdirection and time 
delay. We predicted that participants would understand the trick more often in the condition 
without misdirection, less in the time delay force condition, and the lesser in the baseline force. 
At the inverse, we predicted that participants would feel more control in the Criss-Cross 
condition, less in the time delay force condition, and the lesser in the no misdirection force 
condition, as following this order, the trick was becoming easier to understand. As in 




 90 participants (54 women, 36 men) between 18 and 50 years old (M=24.7, SD=7.64) 
recruited on the same spot as Experiment 1 in Goldsmiths took part in the experiment. Before 
the experiment, we ran an a priori power analysis for an ANOVA with f = 0.35 (moderate effect 
size), α = 0.05, and a power of 0.8. The output of the analysis advised for 84 participants, and 
we chose a moderate effect size based on the fact that the investigated factors are believed to 
be the two keys to the success of the trick. We therefore estimated the impact of each of them 
separately to be of moderate size, and an effect of .35 seemed one to be worth finding. 
 
Procedure 
To investigate our hypothesis, we had three experimental conditions. In the first 
condition the Criss-Cross was performed in the usual way with attentional misdirection which 
also created a natural time delay (Criss-Cross Force). In the second condition only time delay 
was used (time delay force) without diverting attention away from the cards.  Here the 
experimenter, simply stared at the deck for 5 seconds before instructing the participants to take 
“their card” by pointing at the forced card. This allowed us to create a time delay without trying 
to divert the participant’s attention away from the deck. The third condition used no 
misdirection or time delay (no misdirection condition).  Each participant was randomly 
assigned to one of the conditions. 
As in the first experiment, after the participants took their card without looking at it, 
they were asked to answer the questions about their feeling of freedom for cutting the deck and 
their feeling of control for the outcome card. We also wrote down whether the participants 
understood the trick and asked them to repeat the whole event sequence they remembered, 
including the experimenter’s gestures, to investigate if they misremembered what happened.  
 Results and Discussion 
Out of the 90 participants, only 4 understood that their action didn’t have any impact on 
the outcome card they had selected, which confirms results from Experiment 1 showing that 
the Criss-Cross is a solid forcing technique. From these 4 participants, 2 were in the Criss-Cross 
Force condition, 1 in the time delay force condition and 1 in the no misdirection force condition. 
A Bayesian Chi-squared test comparing these proportions across the three experimental 
conditions showed very strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis, (B01=50.2), suggesting 
that the data were 50 times more likely to occur under the null rather than alternative hypothesis. 
This shows that the experimental conditions had no impact on participants’ understanding of 
the fact they were forced.  
We then investigated the effect of our experimental conditions on participants’ sense of 
control and feeling of freedom. Bayesian ANOVAs1 with default prior scales revealed that the 
null hypothesis was preferred to the alternative hypothesis by a Bayes factor of 7.29 for the 
sense of control and 2.12 for the feeling of freedom.  The data provide substantial evidence 
against the hypothesis that time delay and attentional misdirection are important keys for the 
success of the trick. In the same way, these results provide some anecdotal evidence against the 
hypothesis that these factors impact participants’ feeling of freedom when cutting the deck of 
card.  
 
                                                            
1 Bayesian ANOVAs do not necessitate normally distributed data (Kruschke, 2010). 
 Figure 4. Mean sense of agency over the outcome (A) and feeling of freedom for the action (B) 
across the three experimental conditions. Errors bars are shown with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
These first analyses thus suggest, contrary to our predictions and to common knowledge 
among magicians, that the Criss Cross force does not rely on misdirection. Our results illustrate 
that participants struggle to understand the event sequence even when the trick is performed 
without time delay. Participants failed to realize that their action had no impact on the outcome, 
the card they end up with. Also, when asked to repeat the events themselves most participants 
showed they misremembered what happened, and they were either not able to remember what 
happened after they cut the deck or they remembered that the magician told them to take the 
top card of the top pile for example. 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 2 shows that the Criss-Cross force works regardless of whether attention is 
misdirected or not. In the final experiment we tried to break the illusion by explicitly 
demonstrating that the chosen card was independent of their action. 
To do so, we numbered the back of every card with numbered from 1 to 52, making it 
easy to see that the outcome card is the same as the card which was at the top of the deck from 
the beginning. Like this, we could be sure participants do not fail to correctly see which card is 
on top, and which one is the one resulting from their action. This time however, we compared 
the Criss-Cross to an even more simplified version of the trick, using a more usual way of 
dealing with cards, to investigate whether the Criss-Cross event sequence explains the success 
of the force. 
We predicted that participants will more often understand that their choice was 
manipulated in a simpler sequence of the trick rather than in the Criss-Cross Force. Thus, the 




60 participants (35 women, 25 men, mean age= 23.7, SD= 6.95), recruited in the same 
venue as Experiments 1 and 2 took part in this experiment. An a priori power analysis was run 
before the experiment, for a Chi-squared test with w=0.4 (moderate to strong effect size), α= 
0.05, and a power of 0.8. The output required a sample size of 50 participants. We based our 
effect size on the fact that the cross shape seemed to be the last element of the trick possibly 
making it work, therefore expecting it to have a quite strong effect on participants' sense of 
control and understanding of the trick. 
 
Procedure 
We randomly numbered the back of every card from 1 to 52 and had two experimental 
conditions. In the first condition, the Criss-Cross force was performed as in our second 
experiment no misdirection condition, without any time delay or attentional misdirection. The 
only change was the numbers on the back of the cards. For the second condition, we used a 
simpler event sequence: the cards were also numbered on their back, and the experimenter 
simply ask the participants to cut the deck of card. Then, she directly asked them to “take their 
card”, but still pointing at the forced one, which was the one on the top of the deck from the 
beginning. Since this procedure did not contain the cross, participants should be able to 
understand their choice is manipulated.   
 
Results and Discussion 
Out of the 60 participants, 19 understood their action did not have any impact on their 
outcome card. Five were in the Criss-Cross condition, and 14 in the Simple-Cut sequence. A 
Bayesian Chi-squared provided substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis (B10=6.26). 
These results suggest that the data are approximately 6 times more likely to occur under H1 than 
H0 (see Figure 5), and validates our hypothesis. Participants were significantly more likely to 
realize their actions had no impact in the Simple-Cut condition.  However, even though 
participants had all the visual information to follow the force procedure correctly (numbers on 
the back of the cards) only 17% of them realized that their actions had no impact on the 
outcome. A plausible mechanism which could explain this failure results from the unusual way 
of dealing the cards.  We suggest that this procedure provokes an attribute substitution error in 
which participants think they have the outcome of their cut. Attribute substitution consists of 
substituting an element/information of an ambiguous or complex problem for a more 
usual/easier one (Kahneman et al., 2002; Kahneman, Frederick, Kahneman, & Frederick, 2001). 
The attribution substitution error may account for the Criss-Cross Force, in that a complex and 
unusual way of cutting the cards is substituted for a simpler one. However, in the Simple-Cut 
condition, the event sequence would not require participants to substitute any element of the 
sequence, and yet less than half the participants realized that their actions had no impact.  
This time again, when showing what they remembered from the sequence, most of the 
participants thought they took the top card that they cut to or did not remembered which pile 
was put on the top of the other by the experimenter. Surprisingly, still more than half of the 
participants in the Simple-Cut condition did not understand they were forced. When questioned, 
they typically explained that because they just expected to have the card they cut at in the deck, 
they assumed it was the one the experimenter told them to take, without paying attention to the 
numbers on the back.  
 
Regarding participants’ feelings of control and freedom, we used a Bayesian Mann-
Whitney U-test with a Cauchy prior of .707. The Bayes factors did not provide any evidence 
for the alternative hypothesis (B10=.806 for the sense of control and B10=.525 for the feeling of 
freedom).  
This suggests that although participants understood their action did not have any impact 
on the outcome card they had, they felt the same amount of control for the result of the trick. 
The overall feeling of control over the outcome card was relatively low across both conditions 
(M= 35.1) and there was a large variation in responses (SD= 36.5).  We suggest that our scale 
and phrasing may not have been optimal to measure the sense of agency the participants felt for 
the outcome of their action. During debriefing, a typical answer to explain their response on the 
agency scale was that they did not feel much in control because they were instructed to take a 
specific card, and could not choose between several.  Other responses were that because they 
could not see in advance the card they were taking, they felt unable to predict the outcome of 
the card. 
 
We then separated participants between those who understood they were forced and 
those who did not, to look at whether they experienced different feelings of control and freedom 
during the trick (Figure 5). Bayesian Mann-Whitney U-tests showed some substantial evidence 
for the alternative hypotheses stating that participants who understood they were forced should 
experience significantly less control over the outcome card than the participants who did not 
understand, this for both experimental conditions (B10=3.30 for the Criss-Cross condition, and 
B10=4.37 for the Simple-Cut condition). However, no or very anecdotal evidence were found 
for the alternative hypotheses regarding participants’ feeling of freedom both in the Criss Cross 
condition (B10=0.39) and the Simple-Cut condition (B10=1.31). These results suggest that when 
participants understood the trick, they understood the fact that they were not in control for the 
outcome card, although they were free to cut wherever they wanted in the deck and were able 
to distinguish were they were manipulated or not. 
 
Figure 5. Sense of agency and feeling of freedom across participants who understood the 
trick and those who did not for both experimental conditions. 
 
Finally, we compared the group of the Criss-Cross condition to the one of our second 
experiment (no misdirection condition) in order to see whether the numbers on the back had 
any significant effect on our dependent variables. Bayesian Mann-Whitney and Chi-Squared 
tests  with default priors regarding participants’ feeling of freedom (B10=0.30), sense of agency 
(B10=0.39) or their understanding of the trick (B10=0.74) did not provide any evidence for the 
alternative hypotheses. This suggests that even when participants could rely on a strong visual 
to follow the event sequence, they were unable to understand they were forced. 
  
General Discussion 
We investigated a magician’s forcing technique – the Criss-Cross Force – which provides a 
simple way to give the illusion that we choose our outcome (i.e. here, a card), when it was in 
fact forced upon us, and predetermined. We demonstrate how people can think they controlled 
an outcome even though their action was meaningless, and instead controlled by another person. 
Results from Experiment 1 showed that participants were unable to differentiate between 
an outcome they controlled and one that was forced upon them. In other words, participants felt 
as much control over their outcome card when this card was forced, as when it was the card 
they themselves selected. Very few (2 out of 30) participants understood that the card was 
forced and that their action of freely cutting the deck had no impact on the outcome.  These 
results add to the illusion of control and sense of agency literature, showing that even when 
facing a relatively simple event sequence, people fail to understand they do not control the 
outcome of their actions. The experiment therefore confirmed that the Criss-Cross Force is a 
simple yet effective way to provide an illusory sense of agency over the outcome of an action. 
This provides new insights into the literature about how our sense of agency is fallible. Previous 
research on priming has shown that it is possible to mislead people into thinking and feeling 
they controlled something when we did not (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Pronin, Wegner, 
McCarthy, & Rodriguez, 2006; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). Here, without priming, 
we showed that it is possible to provide such an illusory sense of agency over an event – more 
precisely over a choice of card. This suggests that we sometimes fail to understand whether we 
are the agent causing somethings in our environment in our day to day live.  Experiment 2 and 
3 explain the plausible mechanisms that underpin this illusion. 
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether misdirection was the key to the success of this 
force. Our survey on magicians revealed that misdirection in the form of diverting attention 
away from the cards and creating a time delay before forcing the card should be the most 
important factors driving the illusion. However, our results do not confirm this view.   
Attentional misdirection and a time delay had no impact on participants’ awareness of the force. 
These results were truly unexpected and confirm that magicians do not always know why their 
tricks work.  Our previous research (Kuhn et al., 2020) has shown that magicians are good at 
estimating the effectiveness of a force, but their intuitions about its mechanism are not 
necessarily correct.  A more scientific approach to the art of magic can illuminate why their 
tricks work, which in turn might help them develop more refined and more powerful deceptive 
principles (Kuhn, 2019; Rensink & Kuhn, 2015). Our results also show that distraction is not 
necessary to experience an illusory sense of control over a simple event sequence. Most of our 
participants failed to correctly remember the exact event sequence even without time delay or 
attentional distraction.  This suggests that even when we are paying attention to an event, we 
can fall victim of an illusory sense of control over it.  
In the final experiment, we tried to break the illusion by explicitly demonstrating that the 
chosen card was independent of their action.  The back of each card was numbered, making it 
obvious that they were choosing the top card.  Rather surprisingly, even without time, or 
attentional misdirection, the force remained successful.  The Criss-Cross procedure resulted in 
a significantly greater illusory sense of agency over the outcome, than when participants are 
simply asked to cut to a card and asked to select the top card from the original pack.  These 
results suggest that the Criss-Cross event procedure itself is largely responsible for the illusion.   
Thomas and colleagues (2018) reported on the Flushtration Count illusion, a perceptual 
reasoning illusion that results from people falsely substituting a complex event sequences with 
a simpler version.  We propose that the Criss-Cross Force relies on a similar attribute 
substitution error in which people substitute the complex and unfamiliar cutting procedure with 
a simpler and more typical one.  In our context, people expect to see a simple set of actions (i.e. 
they cut to a card and get this one), but in reality, they witness a rather more complex set of 
actions.  Participants were unable to correctly represent the event sequence, even though they 
had the visual capacities to follow what happened. Most participants were oblivious to the force 
and simply expected to end up with the card they cut to.  
Across all experiments, most participants misremembered the event sequence when asked 
to show the experimenter what they recalled had just happened. Indeed, most of them failed to 
remember, or realized that the card they took was the forced one.  We initially had two 
hypotheses about this misrepresentation.  Firstly, we expected that attentional misdirection 
leading people’s attention away from the trick, which means they should no longer experience 
the illusion.  Attention plays an important role in determining what people see (Treisman, 
2006), and attentional misdirection is crucial for most magic tricks (Kuhn et al., 2014).  
Likewise, we predicted that an increase in time delay between encoding and card selection, 
would enhance the effectiveness of the force and increase memory distortions.  As Roediger 
notes, “if the cognitive system can err in misrepresenting objects when they are present before 
the eyes, the opportunities for error when a person later tries to recreate happenings of the past 
must be even greater” (Roediger, 1996, p.79). Our results suggest that because of an attribute 
substitution, participants misperceived the Criss-Cross event sequence, therefore also 
misremembering what just happened. Debriefings showed that participants tended to 
misremember the event, thinking that they were asked to take the card they selected thanks to 
their cut. Our memory and perceptual experiences are heavily influenced by expectations and 
prior experiences (de Lange, Heilbron, & Kok, 2018; Kerzel, 2002; Martens & Fox, 2007). It 
is likely that people’s expectations about what was supposed to happen (i.e. getting the card 
they chose) and therefore about how the cards are dealt with (i.e. doing a cross shape with the 
cards with the chosen cards being in the middle of the two piles) led them to alter their memory 
in a way which match these expectations.  Our results have important implications for real life 
situation such as eyewitness testimonies, and how people’s expectations and prior beliefs 
influence our memory for complex event sequences. Previous research has shown that people’s 
expectations arising from stereotypes about social groups influence how people mentally 
represent and event (Lenton, Blair, & Hastie, 2001; Slusher & Anderson, 1987). Participants 
frequently attribute events to an incorrect source, often belonging to the stereotyped group 
(Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011; Bayen, Nakamura, Dupuis, & Yang, 2000; Mather, Johnson, & De 
Leonardis, 1999). For example, Bayen et al. (2000) showed that participants make schema-
based guesses (i.e. whether a statement is more expected to be said by a doctor or lawyer) when 
they could not remember which source (i.e. the doctor or the lawyer) had presented a particular 
item (i.e. a statement). This phenomenon has been shown to be more prominent when perceivers 
are under restricted cognitive capacities (Sherman, Groom, Ehrenberg, & Klauer, 2003), and 
our results suggest that the complexity of the observed event could as well influence it .  
Our results also add to classical findings in choice blindness (Hall & Johansson, 2008; 
Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström, & Deutgen, 2010; Rieznik et al., 2017).  In these studies 
people often fail to detect the mismatch between their choice and the outcome of their choice, 
and although aspects of our paradigm are similar here, there are some crucial differences.  In 
typical choice blindness paradigms, the experimenters use elaborate covert deceptive 
procedures to conceal the switch between the participants’ choice to the changed outcome. In 
our paradigm, the deception occurs in full view and is blatantly obvious, as highlighted in 
experiment 3.  Our experiments show, that people can easily be tricked into believing they have 
control over an outcome that has been predetermined all along. 
 During the debrief participants were asked to explain their answers, and they often 
reported providing low ratings in terms of sense of control because they were instructed to take 
a particular card, or because they could not see the face of the card. In other words, their reports 
of control were not related to the manipulations employed here, but due to the general 
instructions given. This observation dovetails previous research showing that participants feel 
a lesser sense of agency when coercive instructions are given (Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans, 
& Haggard, 2016), or when alternative actions decreased (Barlas, Hockley, & Obhi, 2017; 
Barlas et al., 2018; Barlas & Obhi, 2013). The Comparator model (Carruthers, 2012; Miall & 
Wolpert, 1996) and several other studies (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Sidarus, Vuorre, & 
Haggard, 2017; Tanaka & Kawabata, 2019) further underline the role of prediction of our 
actions’ outcomes in our sense of agency.  However, this relates mainly to somatosensory or 
motor control contexts and for implicit sense of agency, measured by intentional binding (Beck, 
Di Costa, & Haggard, 2017; David, Obhi, & Moore, 2015; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Miall & 
Wolpert, 1996; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Sato, 2009). Our results suggest a confirmation of the 
role of choice alternatives, coercion and prediction in the feeling of control participants feel 
over the outcome of their actions. 
 Limitations 
People’s ability to distinguish between their own and others’ actions and their self-report 
over how much control they experience over an outcome are not entirely equivalent.  However, 
our findings in terms of judging the outcome of an action are central to our understanding of 
the sense of agency more generally. In experiment 3 we showed that participants’ self-reported 
being significantly less in control when they understood that they were not the ones controlling 
the outcome.  We are therefore fairly confident that our measures operationalizing how much 
control they experience over the outcome. We believe finding the most appropriate explicit 
measure of the sense of agency is  one of the main challenges of research in this field. What 
seems to be the most important things to look at in this case, is to be sure that what is measured 
explains some part of the variance. 
All of the experiments were conducted in a café rather than a more isolated laboratory, 
and we cannot rule out the possibility that participants were distracted by their surroundings. 
However, much of our empirical work on forcing is conducted outside the traditional 
experimental laboratory as this provides a more natural way of studying the cognitive 
mechanism that underpin these illusions (see also Shalom et al., 2013).  
 
To conclude, the Criss-Cross force provides us a powerful tool to explore what we called 
the apparent action causation, this illusion that our actions necessarily have an impact over the 
outcome of an event. We showed that people can easily be blind to the fact they are manipulated, 
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